Marinus Johnson and Arlin Davidson v. Joseph Koyle et al : Brief of Appellant, Duke Page by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
Marinus Johnson and Arlin Davidson v. Joseph
Koyle et al : Brief of Appellant, Duke Page
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul J. Merrill; Jackson B. Howard; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnson v. Page, No. 8404 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2432
I 
i 
In the Supreme Court of the ... . 
~ ·, State of Utah ! : ·:.> 
MARINUS J·OHNSON and 
ARLIN DAVIDSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JOSEPH KOYLE, DUKE PAGE, 
and JOHN DOE SYRETT, 
Defendants, 
DUKE PAGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 8404 
Brief of Appellant, Duke Page , -
PAUL J. MERRILL 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
Attorneys for AppeHant 
..... omftuaY 1'1UXrDfll 00 .. ractYO, V'IAII 
U. wf U. 
,• . 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS......................... 1 
STATEMENT IO•F POINTS........................ 5 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT 1 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL 
RIGHTS, EITHER EXPRESS O·R IMPLIED, THAT 
COULD BE ENFORCED.......................... 5 
POINT 2 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S C'AUSE OF ACTION 
OR FIND FOR THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, FOR REA-
SON THAT THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LACHES 
AND THE STATUTE O·F LIMITATION. . . . . . . . . . . 11 
POINT 3 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE 
WAS HELD SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF JOHN-
SON AS JOINT ADVENTURER UNDER AGREE-
MENT - AND IN IMPOSING A TRUST UPON ALL 
THE PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE FO·R THE 
BENEFIT ·01F THE PLAINTIFFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
PO,INT 4 
THAT THlE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING 
ONE-HALF O·F THE TAXES AGAINST PAGE.... 21 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
TABLE Q~F CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, Page 513. . . . . . . . . . 14 
American Law Reports, Vol. 80, Page 27............ 20 
American Law Reports, Vol. 80, P. 28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
American Law Reports, Vol. 80, Page 51. . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
American Law R.eports, VoL 80, P. 88.............. 17 
Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99, P. 460.................. 3 
Hunter v. Hunter, 361 Mo. 799, 237 S. \V. 2nd 100..... 15 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Rule 281. . . . . . 10 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Rule 288. . . . . . 9 
Richard v. Plumbe, et al., 253 P. 2nd 176. . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Shulkin v. Shulkin, 16 N.E. 634, 118 ALR 632. . . . . . . . 16 
State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
100 P. 2nd 575. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Utah C'ode Annotated, 78-12-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Suprem.e Court of the 
State of Utah 
MARINUS JOHNSON and 
ARLIN DAVIDSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents., 
vs. 
JOSEPH KOYLE, DUKE PAGE, 
and JOHN DOE SYRETT, 
Defendants, 
DUKE PAGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 8404 
Brief of Appellant, Duke Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior, to the 21st day of May, 1940, the plaintiff 
Marinus Johnson, was the owner of Water Filing No. 9873, 
filed in the office of the State Engineer of Utah, which he 
had acquired from one William F. Pratt and one Owen (Tr. 
P. 22). At that time the plaintiff, together with one Joseph 
Koyle, who is joined in this action as a party defendant, had 
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a written agreement with one William F. Pratt for the acqui-
sition of 440 acres of land, which is to be hereinafter de-
scribed, located in Juab ·County, Utah. Pratt, prior to the 
time that this agreement was entered into, was homesteading 
the property, and had merely a right of homestead but did 
not have a marketable title, and/wowd not have one until the 
hornestead was perfected, which was contingent upon the 
homestead requirements of the law of the United States and 
upon Pratt surviving to perfect the homestead. With this 
in mind, on the 21st day of May, 1940, the plaintiff, Marinus 
Johnson, and the defendant, Duke Page, entered into a writ-
ten agreement which eontemplated the use of the land which 
was subject to the homestead to be made by and perfected 
by Pratt. This agreement set forth, among other things, 
that Marinus Johnson was the owner of Water Filing No. 
9873, and that in order for the Water Filing to be of any 
value, it would be necessary for the parties to ~con~truct cer-
tain dikes, levies and ditches from the source of water 
in Juab County, kno\vn as Baker's Hot Springs, to the land 
then owned by Pratt, which was to be acquired under the 
contract between Johnson and Pratt, to Johnson and for 
which Page .was to receive an interest" when it was so per-
fected. The purpose of the contract was that the defend-
ant, Page, w.as to furnish money and equipment necessary 
to build the dikes and: levies and that the· plaintiff would 
contribute services, and that the defendant, Page, would be 
paid. for his adv:ancement by receiving one half of the water 
right and improvements, together with one half of the prop-
erty that was to be acquired by the contract. In other 
words, both parties "vere to ~hare equally in the: water, im .. 
provements and the property that was acquired and. in the 
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3 
contributions made, even though the defendant, Page, was 
to advance the money .at that time. 
Thereafter, during the summer of 1940, Page sent men 
and equipment to work upon the canals and levies and dikes 
mentioned in the contract and that the plaintiff, Johnson, 
furnished a truck, and the men worked for a period of ap-
proximately twenty-eight days and that during this period 
Page paid for all gasoline, oil and supplies for this project. 
There is a conflict of evidence as to whether the proaect 
was completed; however, it is the position of the defendant 
that it was (Tr. P. 54, Tr. P. 112). At the end of this period 
both parties withdrew their equipment and the men from 
the job and it never again was resumed. Shortly there-
after, William Pratt died without having acquired a patent 
or title to the land, which was part of his agreement with 
Johnson. 
Approximately three years later the widow of Pratt 
received title to the land by perfecting the homestead, and 
she conveyed. on May 7, 1943, this land to the defendant, 
Duke Page, for $440.00. On October 4, 1944, the defendant, 
Page, entered into a written agreement with one Oran Lewis 
by which he was to sell and convey 440 acres of land, to-
gether with his interest in the Water Filing, for a price of 
$3,750.00. The said Lewis paid Page $350.00 and received 
a deed to one forty-acre piece of property, t~wit: 
Northeast % of the Southeast :14 of Section 10, 
Township 14 South, Range 8 West. 
At this time the agreement between Page and Lewis 
was terminated by a mutual 'Consent in respect to the re-
mainder of the property. 
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During the years 1944 through 1954, Page paid the 
taxes upon the said property, which has been in his name, 
and has made all other and necessary expenditures to the 
maintenance and operation of the property and has held the 
title ostensibly as sole owner. That on October 1, 1949, 
Water Filing No. 9873 lapsed because Page failed to sub-
mit a proof of use or obtain a further extension of time to 
do so, and that after the appUcation lapsed, the plaintiff, 
Davidson, filed upon the water and appropriated it to his 
own use. Arlin Davidson, one of the plaintiffs in this case, 
also acquired title to the forty acres sold by Page to Lewis 
and, in addition, claims title to the property in question as 
a result of an agreement entered into between himself and 
the plaintiff, Marinus Johnson, and his wife, Katy Johnson, 
on the 27th day of May, 1952, whereby the said Johnson 
did sell and assign and convey a one-half interest in the 
property described in the plaintiffs' complaint. 
On the 26th day of September, 1952, suit was com-
menced by the plaintiffs in the District Court of Juab Coun-
ty, State of Utah, to determine the right, title and interest 
of each of the above named plaintiffs and defendants in the 
following described property locarted near Baker's Hot 
Spring, Juab County, State of Utah: 
Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Sec. 10; North Half of the Southwest Quarter, North 
Half and the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quar-
ter, all in Sec. 11; East Half and the Southwest Quarter 
of the Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter;Northeast Quarter of the South-
east Quarter, all in Sec. 14. 
All of said property being in To\vnship, 14 South, 
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and lVIeridian. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PO'lNT 1 
THAT THE COURT ERREJJ) IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS, 
EITHER E~RESS OR IMPLIED, THAT COULD BE 
ENFO~RCED. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILIN·G TO DIS-
MISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION OR FIND 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, FOR REASON THAT 
THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LACHES· AND THE 
STATUTE O~F LIMITATIO'N. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FIND'ING THAT 
THE TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE WAS 
HELD SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF JOHNSON AS 
JOINT ADVENTURER UNDER AGREEMENT- AND 
IN IMPOSING A TRUST UPON ALL THE PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED BY PAGE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE CO·URT ERRED IN ASSESSING ONE-
HALF OF THE TAXES AGAINST PAGE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ANY CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS, 
EITHER EX1PRESS OR IMPLIED, THAT COULD BE 
ENFORCED. 
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In order for ~he plaintiffs to recover .anything under the 
contract, they must show that the same was in good stand-
ing, at least from their point of view, and that the defend-
ant has no legal reason for non-performance or non-com-
pliance. This is the basic premise to this entire suit. 
The plaintiff by his pleading admits that the land in 
question was the land included in that agreement between 
himself, Joseph Koyle and one WilUam F. Pratt (See para-
graph 3 of plaintiffs' second Amended Complaint) and that 
the tit~~ to this land was to be perfected by Pratt, who was 
then homeste~ding the same. This contract was dated 
March 8, 1939, and was for the obvious purpose of uniting 
this land, as soon as the patent was obtained, with the water 
to be secured under the plaintiff's application No. 9873, 
whi·ch apparently had been filed :by Pratt· to be used on the 
land· Pratt was homesteading. The plaintiff, at that time, 
had commenced the construction work on the dikes and 
levies that later became an essential part of the contract 
between Johnson and Page. This fact is rightfully con-
cluded in the court's Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2. 
"That on the 21st d~y of May, 1940, the plaintiff, 
Marinus Johnson, was the owner of water filing No. 
9873 filed in the office of the State Engineer of Utah 
and the water rights represented thereby being an ap-
plication filed by William F. Pratt to appropriate 19 
c. f. s. of water fr~m a spring known as Baker Hot 
Spring for irrigation of lands adjacent thereto." 
"Tl)at at that time said plaintiff together with the 
defendant, Joseph Koyle, had a written agreement with 
said William F. Pratt for the acquisition by said John-
son and Koyle of 440 acres of land described in plain-
tiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which land said Pratt 
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was then occupying or claiming under some preferential 
entry right." 
In· other words, the same 440 acres of ground encom-
passed hy the plaintiffs' complaint and the Court's findings 
1 aild 2 is the same 440 acres referr~d to in the Court's Con-
clusion of Law No. 2: 
. ''That by reason of this the title acquired by Page 
·· · to the 440 acres of land involved herein should be con-
sidered to be held subject to the rights of Johnson as 
a joint adventurer under said agreement." 
The next premise to consider, then, is what the parties 
in~ended by their contract of May 21, 1950, 'which contract 
this suit was based upon. Obviously and admittedly, the 
. ' 
parties intended. that· Johnson would initially put up his 
water application and Page would put up money and equip-
ment to build the levy. Now, what were they going to_ put 
the water on and for what purpose were they going to bulld 
the dikes and levies? The answer to this question is obvious 
--the land which Johnson was to acquire from Pratt by 
contract, which acquisition was conditioned upon Pratt per-
fecting his title by homesteading it (See Transcript Page 
55). 
It was for this reason that the contract (Exhibit "A") 
contained the f<ollowing language: 
"and the second party shall also be enttield to an equal 
one-half interest in any and all lands or interest therein, 
or contracts with respect to lands or interests therein, 
owned or possessed by the First Party, or to the-. ac-
quired in any lands or property connected with or per-
taining to the appropriation within the project conte·m7. 
plated." 
(Emphasis added) 
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Although the above cited :passage is not clear in and of 
itself the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court and 
the circumstances surrounding this contract show conclu-
sively that the property intended by this agreement was the 
property to be obtained by Johnson under the contract. How 
else were they going to use the water? 
"In the interpretation of an agreement the sur-
rounding circumstances at the time it was made should 
be considered for the purpose of ascertaining its mean-
ing." 
Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99P. 460. 
For the :plaintiff to contend that there was no specific 
piece of land intended or contemplated (Tr. Page 15, 23, 25; 
Page 96) is contrary to both law in fact. In the first place 
he says (Tr. Page 15) "and we went down to Delta. He 
looked the property over'', which indicates that a particular 
piece of property was intended and an integral part of the 
contract~ In the second place, the court is charged with 
judicial knowledge that a water filing without land to bene-
ficially use it upon is of absolutely no value. The plaintiff 
admits he hao no other l·and other than that contracted for, 
and, consequently, how can he say he merely owned a water 
~pplication (Tr. Page 15). You can't own that ·without the 
land to put it on, therefore, when Pratt died and it became 
obvious that Johnson could not perform his part of the 
agreement, the contract terminated for lack of a subject 
matter. 
The Whole contract was contingent upon Pratt ·per-
fecting title which in turn Johnson would get by contract; 
otherwise,. what was Page to get for his efforts? Although 
the language of the contract is broad it is obvious· that no 
one ever intended that the ·contract would have a coptinuing 
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effect to make Page a trustee of property acquired at a 
later date by Page, not through Johnson or Pratt, hut from 
another party. 
If the court's rational in respect to Conclusion No. 2 
were sotind then Page would become an unwilling trustee 
for Johnson if he acquired the property by any means and 
at any time afterward--even if he acquired irt by inheritance, 
purchase or foreclosure. 
This, surely, is attaching a meaning far different than 
the language and intent of the parties anticipated. 
The true fact is, that when Pratt died the contract 
ceased to he enforceable, for a condition precedent to lia-
bility had become impossible to obtain-to-wit: Receiving 
title from Pratt. This situation is usually referred to as a 
destruction of means of performance contemplated but not 
contracted for. The contract could not be performed be-
cause of the i~mpossibility of obtaining title from the source 
contemplated. It ·cannot be said that the contract was in-
tended to forever bar the defendant, Page, from forever 
dealing with the property without becoming a trustee for 
Johnson of such interest that he might obtain. 
The only correct conclusion that the court could come 
to was that the contract ceased upon Pratt's death because 
of a supervening impossibility of performance. 
The Restatement sets forth the rule as follows: 
"Where the assumed possibility of a desired object 
or effect to be attained by either party to a ·contract 
forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and 
this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a 
promisor who is without fault in causing the frustra-
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tion, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from 
the duty of performing his promise unless a eontrary 
intention appears.'' 
Restatement Ru1e 288. 
This is exactly the situation in the principal case. Both 
Johnson and Page assumed that the land in question was 
that to be obtained from Pratt. If the reverse were true 
we would ·have in effect a contract to build levies, dikes and 
canals to be used on certain lands, one-half of whi~ch lands 
were to belong to each of the parties to the contract if and 
-vvhen either of them acquired them. This is incongruous 
and inconsistent with the facts. 
Another analogy to the principal situation ·which is also 
in point is Restatement Rule 281, which is as follows: 
"In promises for an agreed exchange, a promisor 
is discharged from the duty of performing his promise 
if substantial performance of the return promise is im-
possible because of the non-existence, destruction or 
in1.pairment of the requisite subject matter or means 
of performance, provided that the promisor has not 
·himself wrongfully caused the irnpossibility or has not 
assumed the duty that the subject-matter or means of 
performance shall exist unimpaired.'' 
Illustration 2 under the a'bove citation is a good ·analogy 
to appellant's argument that because the first contract failed 
because of the impossibility of obtaining the subject matter, 
the fact that it later becomes possible does not renew or re-
store the contract. 
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POINT 2 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIS-
MISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION OR FIND 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, FOR REASON THAT 
THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LACHES AND THE 
STATUTE 0'F LIMITATIO'N. 
The law in Utah in respect to the Statute of Limitations 
upon an action based upon contract is as follows: 
U. C. A. 78-12-23-Within six years: 
1. An action for mesne p1~ofits of real estate. 
2. An action upon any eontract, obligation or lia-
bility founded upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in the preceding sec-
tion. 
In matters involving equitable p.voblems the question of 
laches is usually resolved on the basis of the Statute of Limi-
tations in respect to similar legal questions, and the defense 
of the Statute of Lirnitations includes the defense of laches. 
The court, in effect, found that in the summer of 1940 
the defendant, Page, recalled his employees from the work 
project of building the levies and canals and that thereafter 
the work was never resumed. There can be no other con-
clusion from this finding of the court other than that the 
court eoncluded that Page breached his contract during the 
summer of 1940 by withdrawing his men. If so, there was 
a breach of contract which the plaintiff could have sued 
upon and recovered such damage as he, at that time, had 
sustained. It is a primary principle of law that a party has 
the duty to minimize his damages and cannot sit baek and 
idly wait for his damages to magnify and then e~ect to. 
recover the increased amount. This is such an elementary 
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point of law, we do not believe it is necessary to give to the 
Court citations; consequently, if the plaintiff has a cause 
of action, it arose in the summer of 1940, and he should 
have commenced his litigation at that time. Subsequently 
to that, on the 7th day of May, 1943, the court found that 
Page obtained title to the property, which, if he did so ·con-
trary to the purposes of the contract entered into between 
he and the plaintiff, Jolmson, constituted an additional 
breach, which at that time would have allowed Johnson to 
have brought his suit for an accounting and for a division 
of the property, if he claims such was the case and his dam-
ages then .would have been the same as they are now and, 
in fact, there would not have been taxes that have accrued 
of which one-half have been assessed against the plaintiff. 
Johnson admits that shortly after Page received the 
property from Mrs. Pratt thart he demanded a half interest, 
but that Page refused him (Tr. P. 24, L. 10 to L. 26). That 
is when he should have brought his suit, for it was then that 
his cause of action, if ·any, accrued. In other words, as early 
as May 7, 1943, and, in fact, during the summer of 1940, this 
action could reasonably have been commenced and should 
have been commenrced, and it is rather late and untimely 
for the plaintiff to come to court at this time and ask for 
relief and damages. There is no question that if the alle-
gations of the plaintiff are true and if the Findings of the 
court are true, that on October 4, 1944, there was an addi-
tional breach, in that Page conveyed all of the property ac-
quired to one Lewis for a price of $3,750.00. At that time, 
there would have been no question but what the plaintiff 
had a cause of action, if the other allegations contained in 
his complaint are true, which the appellant does not, by this 
argument, admit. Nothing has accrued since October 4, 
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1944, that has ·changed his situation any or that has given 
the plaintiff any new cause of action, and, in fact, all the 
rights that had accrued, had accrued at this time without 
question. It is obvious from this, then, that he should have 
commenced his suit, in any event, not later than six years 
from the 4th day of October, 1944. The court doesn't even 
contend anything different than this, for the court failed 
to make a finding that the joint adventure, if that is what 
it was, continued after October 4, 1944, and, in fact, the 
court found by its Conclusion of Law No. 3 as follows: 
"That by reason of Page's failure to furnish men 
and equipment for completing the levee and canal as 
agreed by him and his failure to pay necessary fees and 
costs to complete ~the appropriation of water referred 
to in said agreement and by reason of his failure to 
make any offer or tender herein to complete such ·work 
or to reinstate or recover such water filing he should 
be considered to have abandoned his right to continue 
as a joint adventurer in respect to the property and pro-
ject herein involved." 
You will note that by the above ·conclusion, the defend-
ant, Page, is said to have abandoned his right to continue 
the joint adventure by his failures, as stated therein. When 
did those failures take place? In the summer of 1940. If 
that were the situation, then that is when the breach took 
place. How, then, can there be any defense under any cir-
cumstances to the statutes of limitations having barred the 
plaintiffs' case? It was pleaded, it was proved, and the 
court failed and neglected, and, in fact, refused to make 
a finding upon it. 
The Utah Supreme Court has considered this matter 
on many occasions. Perhaps the most clear enunciation of 
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th~_rul~ was made in the case of State Tax Commission vs.· 
Spanish Fork, found in 99 Utah 177, 100 Pacific Second 575, 
for the court said: 
"The general rule is that an action accrues at ·the 
time it becomes remedial in the ·Courts, that is, when 
recourse to. the courts will. render full r~medy.'.' 
The question is then, when did the cause of action ac-
crue? The rule is that it accrues at the time when it 
beoomes remedial in the Courts, that. is when ·the claim 
is in such condition ~hat the court can proceed and give 
judgment if the claim is established. In Sweetser vs. 
Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 Pacific 599, we find: "It is a rule 
of universal application that a cause or right. of action 
arises at the moment an action ·may be maintained to 
enforce it and that the Statute of Limitations is then 
, set in motion. The test, therefore, is: Can an action 
be maintained upon the particular cause of action in 
question? If it can, the statutes begins to run." 
~othing can be said contrary to. these rules, and it is 
obvious that these rules apply to this particular case. There 
may be some question as to whether there was an accrual 
of. a ~·eause of action.-·The ordinary inter.pretation of the ac-
crual is as follows: 
"A cause of aetion upon a covenant accrues as in 
other cases at the moment of the default ·on the part 
of the covenantor. That is·, upon its failure to do the 
thing agreed to which constitutes the breach.· Not un-
til then •can an action be brought for breach of cov-
enant. The question of tb.~ .. accrual of the cause of ac-
tion on a covenant is important. Not only in.determin-
ing the prematurity of the commencement of the ac-
tion, but also the question whether it is brought with-
, in the time limited for bringing such action. ·Action 
for breach of covenant are, of course, subject to the 
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defense of the statutes of limitations, if not brought 
within the time limited by the statutes for bringing such 
acti , . on. 
14 Am. Jur. 513, Sec. 37. 
In the case of Hunter v. H·unter, 361 Mo. 799, 237 SWnd 
100, 24 ALR 2nd 611, the court said: 
"Statutes of Limitations are favored in the law, 
and cannot be avoided unless the party seeking to so 
brings himself strictly within some exception." (Cita-
tions) ''Such exceptions are strictly construed and are 
not enlarged upon by the Courts upon consideration 
of apparent hardship." 
POINT 3 
THAT THIE COURT ERRED IN FINDIN·G THAT 
THE. TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PAGE WAS 
HELD SUBJEC'lj TO THE RIGHTS OF JOHNSON AS 
JOINT ADVENTURER UNDER AGREEMENT- AND 
IN IMPOSING A TRUST UPON ALL THE PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED BY PAGE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
The court erred in finding that the title ·acquired by 
Page was held subject to the rights of Johnson as joint ad-
venturer under the said agreement. In imposing a trust 
upon Page for all of the property acquired by him and mak-
ing it for the benefit of Johnson, it is obvious that this find-
ing is grossly unfair. Even assuming the worst, that Page's 
acquisition of the propevty was a breach of a fiduciary re-
lationship, and even assuming that it was done by fr-aud, 
with an intent to appropriate something that belonged to 
another, can it be said that Johnson can sit back for a pe~ 
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riod of fifteen years and do nothing about it and contribute 
nothing to the acquisition of the property or the expenses 
of maintaining the property, or to the taxes or to anything 
else and yet, when he sees that there is something to be 
gained by it, to come in and claim that he is a joint adven-
turer and that a trust is imposed? In other words, it gives 
Johnson the opportunity of becoming a joint adventurer or 
a title holder or the beneficiary of a trust, without risking 
any of his own time or capital. 
In the event that the acquisition by Page had been a 
failure and an runpvofitable venture, and, in fact, a losing 
proposition, it is quite obvious that Johnson would have 
claimed that there was no joint venture·; that the same had 
been aJbandoned in 1940, and that he had no interest what-
ever in the property. In other words, the contention of 
Johnson in this case is obviously a one-way street. Of 
course, it is rather universally held that the plaintiff in such 
instances cannot recover for the reasons stated. 
In the case of Shulkin vs. Shulkin, 16 NE 2d 634, quo-
ted in 118 ALR 632, it is said: 
"that the contention that the wrong doer should be ex-
cluded from participating in the profits was rejected 
and a partner who wrongfully appropriated firm prop-
erty and made secret profits for which he was required 
to account to the partnership, was held entitled to a 
share in such profits with his co-partner.'' 
The court took the view that the correct principle was 
that the innocent partner should be put as nearly as possible 
in the same position he would have occupied if there had 
been no ·wrong doing, and that this result ·would be accom-
plished by giving him that portion of the misappropriated 
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property and secret profits to Which he would have been en-
titled if the misappropriated property had been allowed to 
remain with the partnership and the secret profits had been 
earned by the partnership in the usual course of the busi-
ness. In other words, by giving the innocent partner or 
joint adventurer all of the profits gained or all of the prop-
erty acquired is an undue penalty, :and is in a sense an un-
just enrichment. No one would argue that the wrong doing 
joint adventurer should not be responsible for any damages 
he has caused the innocent party, but to take everything that 
has been acquired. by him and gained by hun and give it to 
the innocent party does not make a right, but just commits 
another wrong, and, a:s the saying goes, "Two wrongs never 
make a right." 
In 80 ALR, Page 88, it is said: 
"Where one who has abandoned a joint adventure 
is permitted to share in the subsequently earned pro-
fits, damages for abandonment of the enterprise should 
be deducted from his share." 
The above rule applies even in cases where the aban-
doning partner or joint adventurer did nothing to acquire 
subsequently earned profits, but there is no question that 
he is entitled to join in them if he, through his efforts, earned 
them. Can it be said that Page has in any way breached 
the contract more than Johnson? Wherein has Johnson 
come in and devoted any time or money or effort as required 
in the contract for the construction and building of canals 
and ditches? Wherein has Johnson done anything to suc-
cessfully conclude the contract as required in its written 
form? Nothing; he has done exactly as stated above. He 
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has sat back and expected to reap the profits if there were 
a profit, but to take no part if it were a loss. 
The court, in the case of Kinlock vs. Hamlin, cited in 
80 ALR, Page 51, says: 
"He comes into equity with an ill grace, to claim 
compensation on a contract which he utterly renounced 
and repudiated, to claim an account of the profits o.f 
the concern which he forthwith abandoned when he 
supposed it would be a losing business." 
The defendant respectfully suggests that this is the po-
sition the plaintiff is in, in this case. It is he who has aban-
doned and repudiated the -contract, if anyone has, for he 
has done nothing that is required of him, but complains on-
ly of the defendant. 
The court erred in failing to find that the contract had 
been abandoned as early as the summer of 1940. All the 
evidence (Transcript Page 32, 55), points out that the con-
tl~act was abandoned at that time by ]:)oth parties. There 
can be no question, however, that it was abandoned by Oc-
tober of 19'44, when Page conveyed the property to Lewi8. 
Under the circumstances the court should have found that 
the conduct of the parties constituted an abandonment ter-
mination of the original agreement (May 21, 1940, agree-
ment)~ 
The plaintiff admits that he signed a deed, a quit claim 
deed, to Lewis in October, 1944 (Tr. P. 25) and yet he says 
that he didn't find out about the conveyance until 4 or 5 
years after Page had acquired the property. Yet, on Page 
24, Johnson says when he found Page owned the property 
he made demand for his half interest (which couldn't, there-
fore, have been later than 1944) and that Page refused to 
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give it to him (Tr. P. 24, L. 10 to 26), and yet he waits for 
over 10 years before prosecuting this action. What better 
evidence could there be of abandonment? 
This case is almost identical in nature to the case of 
Richards, et al.- vs. Plumbe, et a1, 253 P. 2nd 126. In that 
case, the plaintiff and defendant had on March i7, 1947, 
entered into a written agreement similar to the one in the 
instant case, whereby the parties were to secure certain 
land within the Rio Vista Gas Filed Area for the purpose 
of oil e~ploration. Through the failure of the parties to get 
a license from the state and for other reasons, all the licen-
ses expired in the latter part of May, 1947. (In the instant 
case, the parties abandoned the contract in the summer of 
1940, and the source of the property, Pratt, died shortly 
afterw-ard, which are analogous facts). The appellant, Rich-
ards, went about other business (as did Johnson in the in-
stant case), and the appellant, Richards went to Wyoming. 
Plumbe continued on and secured the property and com-
menced to drill a well upon it. Plaintiffs, .appellants herein, 
brought suit to have their interest declared ·-arid for their 
share of the rentals which they yield. The court said: 
"Nowhere in the record does it appear that either 
appellant made the slightest contribution toward se-
curing either the first or second community lease. The 
facts as disclosed by Smith's testimony show no rela-
tion whatever between the original undertaking of ap-
pellants and Plumbe, and the activities of Plumbe and 
his associates in securing the exploiting the first and 
second community leases. The conduct of appellants, 
and of Plumbe, is wholly inconsistent with the existence 
of either a partnership 0[' joint venture. As is said in 
Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App. 2nd 152, 162, 115 P.2d 613, 
619 "The abandonment or dissolution of a partnership 
' 
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or joint adventure may take place by conduct incon-
sistent with its continuance." See also, Middleton v. 
Newport, 6 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 56 P.2d 508; and Fooshe v. 
Sunshine, 96 Ca. App. 2d 336, 343, 215 P.2d 66, 16 A. 
L.R. 2d 1142. Such was the determination of the trial 
court here, and this finding is, in our opinion abundant-
ly supported by substantial evidence.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the above case is in 
point in all particulars. 
In 80 A.L.R. 27 we find an annotation that is in point, 
which is as follows: 
"Where there has been a complete termination of 
the deal for the consumation of which the partnership 
or joint tenancy was formed, the joint interest of the 
parties having been completely severed hy abandon-
ment or otherwise, it has been held, contrary to the 
general rule governing the rights of the parties after 
dissolution, that thereafter each party may proceed for 
his own individual benefit, without being accountable 
to his former partner or co-adventurer for subsequently 
earned profits.'' 
"This rule is more frequently applied in the case of 
joint adventures, particularly joint advtentures for the 
purchase and sale of real estate." 
(Emphasis added) 
"Thus, where a joint adventure for the purchase 
and sale of land, whereby one was to supply the capi-
tal and purchase the land, and the other was to act as 
agent in finding a purchaser, was never carried out, no 
purchaser being found for the land, and the party sup-
plying the capital took the land in his own name, and 
the adventure was terminated, it was held that the sel-
ling agent could not come in, years after, when the 
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value of the land had increased, and claim a share of 
the profits arising out of the transactions at this time." 
McCamey vs. Lighner (1920) 188 Iowa 1271, 
175 N.W. 751, 80 A.L.R. 28. 
This is the rule of the principal ease, and is universally 
applied in eases of this kind where the actions of ·the parties 
indicate termination and abandonment. The oourt in Bring-
gold vs. Sticky (1925) 167 Minn. 343, 202 N.W. 739, 80 A. 
L.R. 28, held: 
"And where the parties enter into a contract for 
the purchase of land for the purpose of selling it at a 
profit, which contract is abandoned because of inability 
to pay ~or the land, and where one of such parties sub-
sequently secures the land in an independent transac-
tion and sells the same at a profit, it is held that the 
other parties have no right to share in such profits." 
This ruling is to facts almost identical to those in the 
principal case, except here the contract was mutually aban-
doned because neither party desired to go ahead with the 
construction of the eanals and dikes, and also because the 
land was unobtainable from the source (Pratt) originally 
planned. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING O·NE-
I-IALF OF THE TAXES AGAINST PAGE. 
What explanation ean the court make for such a hold-
ing? There was no finding that a sum equivalent to one-
half the taxes eonstituted the plaintiffs' damages. If there 
was no finding of damages in this amount there is no legal 
principle upon which this assessment can stand. 
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The law is clear that in a case where there is fraudu-
lent or wrongful acquisition by one of the joint venturers 
he is nevertheless entitled to share in the proceeds of that 
acquisition to the extent he was to share in the joint ad-
venture in the first place, less whatever damage he has 
caused the other joint adventurer or adventurers. 
In this case the defendant, Page, has acquired nothing, 
but has been penalized for one-·half of the taxes paid during 
the years 1944 through 1954, and the court has made no 
finding oT explanation whatever as to wthy, how or on what 
legal principle such finding was based upon. The inconsis-
tent part about this finding is that the court held he was 
entitled to the entire amount of his other e~nditures in 
respect to the property returned. Why one-half in one in-
stance and the full amount in the other? 
CONCLUSION 
There is no justification in law or in fact :for the find-
ing and decree of the court, and the same should be reversed, 
or remanded for a new trial. 
.Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL J. MERRILL 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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